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ABSTRACT
The Paris Agreement calls on all nations to pursue efforts to contribute to limiting the global
temperature increase to 1.5 C above pre-industrial levels. However, due to limited global,
regional and country-specific analysis of highly ambitious GHG mitigation pathways, there is
currently a lack of knowledge about the transformational changes needed in the coming
decades to reach this target. Through a meta-analysis of mitigation scenarios for Germany, this
article aims to contribute to an improved understanding of the changes needed in the energy
system of an industrialized country. Differentiation among six key long-term energy system
decarbonization strategies is suggested, and an analysis is presented of how these strategies
will be pursued until 2050 in selected technologically detailed energy scenarios for Germany.
The findings show, that certain strategies, including the widespread use of electricity-derived
synthetic fuels in end-use sectors as well as behavioral changes, are typically applied to a
greater extent in mitigation scenarios aiming at high GHG emission reductions compared to
more moderate mitigation scenarios. The analysis also highlights that the pace of historical
changes observed in Germany between 2000 and 2015 is clearly insufficient to adequately







In the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change, which
represents the first universal, legally binding global
climate agreement, 195 countries agreed on limiting
the increase in the global average temperature to
‘well below 2 C’ and pursuing efforts to limit the tem-
perature increase to 1.5 C relative to pre-industrial
levels. Therewith, the Paris agreement has set the
long-term temperature goal below the previous
threshold of 2 C, which despite its role as a reference
point in previous mitigation debates has often been
criticized for being inadequate to avoid severe nega-
tive impacts of climate change [1]. By lowering the
long-term temperature goal to ‘well below’ 2 C and
possibly to 1.5 C, the concerns of both scientists and
countries most vulnerable to climate change have
been accounted for by the global community of
states. Yet, despite this fact and the prominence of
these two temperature limits, so far only limited
knowledge exists on the one hand about the actual
influence a half-degree difference in the global tem-
perature increase can have on the severity of climate
change impacts [2] and on the other hand regarding
what mitigation pathways in line with a 1.5 C limit
might look like and how they may differ from mitiga-
tion pathways in line with a 2 C warming.
While there have been numerous assessments of the
2 C target, trajectories below 2 C have long been
regarded as technologically unfeasible and/or politically
unenforceable, which has led to a lack of research assess-
ing the climate and policy implications of lower tempera-
ture limits [3,4]. Hence, to better understand the
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission pathways and impacts,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has been asked by the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to prepare a spe-
cial report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 C
and related global GHG emission pathways. To inform
this assessment and the political debate, further research
efforts dedicated to addressing the differences between
2 and 1.5 C global warming and the associated mitiga-
tion pathways are called for [3,5,6].
In regards to the climate change impacts, the exist-
ing research already indicates that the half-degree dif-
ference in global temperature increase can have a
significant influence on the severity of the climate
change effects. Although a temperature increase of
0.5 C itself may not seem significant, the probability
of extreme heat, floods, droughts and storms is
expected to increase significantly with 2 C warming
compared to 1.5 C warming [2,7–9].
With the available assessments already emphasizing
that a temperature limit of 1.5 C could make an
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important difference in terms of climate-related risks,
the question is how mitigation pathways in line with
this long-term temperature goal could be designed.
Although research is ongoing, at present only a very
small number of global scenarios consistent with the
1.5 C goal exist. According to the Emissions Gap
Report 2016 of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) [101] none of these published scenar-
ios achieves the 1.5 C limit permanently with a
probability of 66% or more, and many of the existing
1.5 C scenarios assume application of negative emis-
sions technologies [10,11] to offset emissions. Yet there
is evidence available in the scientific literature that sup-
ports the assumption that limiting global warming to
1.5 C might still be achievable [101,12,13]. This could
essentially be accomplished by means of radical and
early GHG emission reductions. According to Rogelj
et al. [13], this implies that carbon emissions worldwide
need to be reduced to net zero between 2045 and
2060. Similarly, Robiou du Pont et al. [14] set the year
of net zero emissions for the EU at 2057.
However, the sum of current (Intended) Nationally
Determined Contributions ((I)NDCs) fall substantially
short of enabling the 1.5 C or even the 2 C tempera-
ture limit to be reached [14]. Hence, in order to achieve
such far-reaching emission reductions in a relatively
short amount of time, country- and region-specific
analyses and quantifications of emissions reduction
pathways are required to provide decision makers with
reliable information on necessary climate mitigation
measures. Country- or region-specific analysis is
needed (in addition to global analysis) because
regional requirements might differ strongly from the
global developments and local stakeholders and deci-
sion makers are more likely to relate to local objectives
than to targets for the global level [15]. However, so far
systematic assessments and a common understanding
of the challenges to achieving the long-term mitigation
goals on a regional or country level are sparse.
This is also true for the energy sector, for which few
studies exist that focus specifically on energy-system
characteristics that would be in line with a 1.5 C target
[13]. As globally the energy sector is responsible for the
majority of GHG emissions, mitigation pathways for
this sector will have to play a key role in keeping the
temperature rise within the 1.5 C limit. Analyzing the
implications a temperature limit of either 2 or 1.5 C
could have for the development of the energy sector is
therefore of high importance, particularly as invest-
ment decisions in the energy sector are usually long
term, and therefore bear the risks of technology lock-
ins [16]. Furthermore, in order to reach net-zero CO2
emission by about 2060, a scaled-up deployment of a
portfolio of technologies, including renewables, high-
efficiency technologies, low-carbon transport options
and possibly also negative emissions technologies (e.g.
bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, BECCS)
will be needed [17]. To achieve these developments,
increased efforts and sustained political commitment
will be required [18].
Addressing these two research needs of additional
country-level studies on the one hand and analysis of
the energy system characteristics in line with a 1.5 C
target on the other hand, this paper aims to contribute
to the debate by analyzing the implications of the
1.5 C temperature target compared to the previous
‘below 2 C’ trajectory for the energy system transition
in Germany. To date, Germany’s 2050 GHG emission
reduction target range is quite broad, aiming at an 80
to 95% reduction relative to 1990. Considering that
limiting warming to 1.5 C will require global GHG
emissions to be reduced to net zero during the next
40 years, the upper limit of the target range with 95%
GHG emission reductions by 2050 seems to be more in
line with the 1.5 C target [102], while the lower end of
the target range with about 80% GHG emission reduc-
tions is more likely to be consistent with 2 C global
warming. Therefore, comparing scenarios for Germany
aiming at either 80% or 95% GHG emission reductions
by 2050 allows an analysis of the differences implied in
transitions to low-carbon energy futures consistent
with either 2 or 1.5 C global warming.
Accordingly, the research objective of this paper is
to better understand the systematic differences
between an 80% and a 95% GHG emissions reduction
strategy and the implications of these differences for
policy decisions in Germany. In particular, the aim is to
contribute to answering the following questions: How
do developments differ in an 80% reduction scenario
compared with a 95% reduction scenario? and, What
are the risks of lock-in in a scenario that reaches an
80% reduction by mid-century, given rapid additional
post-2050 reductions would be needed?
Following a description of the applied comparative
scenario analysis approach in the second section, the
third section describes the scenario selection process
and compares the selected scenarios along six mitiga-
tion strategies and additional sub-strategies. Following
this comparison, the fourth section discusses the key
differences between 80% and 95% reduction scenarios.
Finally, conclusions and recommendations are pro-
vided in the fifth section.
Methods and materials
In Germany, scenarios have frequently been used as
instruments to provide scientific policy advice since
the 1970s [19]. Particularly, for complex and interre-
lated matters like the energy transition and mitigation
of climate change, results of analytical scenario models
have been employed to inform the policy decision-
making process [20]. Accordingly, a large number of
long-term low-carbon (energy) scenario studies for
Germany exist. Although most of these scenarios have
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several characteristics in common, as they all describe
the future emission development and emission reduc-
tion potential for Germany, the modeling techniques,
assumptions or underlying political objectives can vary
significantly. Hence, the results and recommendations
of scenario studies also show considerable differences,
as for example shown for German energy scenarios by
Kronenberg et al. [21].
So for Germany, rather than having a lack of analyti-
cal information, the challenge for the policymaking pro-
cess is to interpret these numerous studies and
recommendations [22]. This study therefore applies a
comparative assessment approach to analyze a range of
existing decarbonization scenario studies for Germany,
in order to provide more systematic and robust answers
regarding the differences the 1.5 C temperature target
entails for the energy system transition in Germany
compared to the previous ‘below 2 C’ trajectory.
A comparative assessment in the context of scenario
analysis can be understood as a systematic review of
scenarios in order to identify common features, differen-
ces and uncertainties. This type of comparison-based
scenario analysis has the advantage that results of a
wide range of studies with different premises can be
taken into account, allowing for a broader and more
systematic perspective [23]. In this study, drawing on
existing low-carbon scenario studies and modeling
work for Germany allows the identification of potential
opportunities and risks, such as technology lock-ins,
that might not have become apparent in a single study.
Despite the advantages, applying a comparative
approach inevitably also has its limitations, namely
that it has to deal with diverse input factors, assump-
tions and modeling techniques, which makes it difficult
to offer reliable explanations for differences, especially
when dealing with many variables and only a small
number of cases [24]. Furthermore, several authors
have found [19,22] that in low-carbon (energy) sce-
nario studies for Germany, the premises are often not
made explicit or are not presented openly. In the pres-
ent study, these challenges of comparing the mitiga-
tion strategies and outcomes of the different scenario
studies was helped by the fact that the analyzed sce-
narios were selected based on a common criteria set,
and under the premise that the studies provide suffi-
cient data, thereby reducing the number of variables
and providing a sound foundation for identifying com-
mon strategies as well as substantial differences.
Similar comparative scenario analysis have, for
example, been conducted by Lechtenb€ohmer et al.
[20] in order to analyze the role of energy efficiency in
German low-carbon energy scenarios, or by €Oko Insti-
tut et al. [103], who analyzed existing scenario studies
in regards to guiding strategies for Germany’s Climate
Action Plan 2050. Likewise, Hillebrandt et al. [25]
applied a comparative scenario analysis to explore the
requirements to achieve deep decarbonization in
Germany, and Schmid et al. [26] conducted a meta-
analysis of 10 German mitigation scenarios in regards
to how and at what cost the transformation of the Ger-
man electricity sector could be achieved. Similarly,
S€oderholm et al. [27] reviewed mainly global energy
scenarios with a special focus on the societal and insti-
tutional transition required to achieve low-carbon
futures, while Loftus et al. [28] analyzed the feasibility
of 12 different global decarbonization scenarios by
benchmarking the assumed pace of energy system
transformation regarding energy and carbon intensity
as well as low-carbon technology deployment against
historical experience. Taking the findings from these
previous studies into account, the analysis presented
in this paper assesses the systematic differences that
result from aiming at the different ends of the German
government’s current 2050 emission reduction target
range.
For comparing energy system scenarios, most stud-
ies directly or indirectly refer to rather simple system
representations known as IPAT (Impact, Population,
Affluence, and Technology), or ImPACT (Impact, Popu-
lation, Affluence, Consumption, and Technology) equa-
tions [29] or as Kaya identity [30,31]. These generic
models typically use three values, affluence (typically
expressed as gross domestic product [GDP]/capita),
energy intensity (primary energy per unit of GDP) and
emission intensity (GHG or CO2 emissions per unit of
primary energy) to represent the driving factors of
energy-related GHG or CO2 emissions in a country or
globally. It has often been acknowledged, however,
that these models are rather simplistic and that influ-
encing factors should be looked at in much more detail
to give sufficient insights into the strategies the ana-
lyzed scenarios assume [32–34].
For the analysis, this metric is therefore expanded to a
system of six key mitigations strategies, on which most
country-level or global bottom-up mitigation scenarios
are based. As scenario studies usually do not set restric-
tions in regards to economic growth1 or even population
growth, strategies that target the affluence element of
the Kaya identity are not discussed in this analysis.
Energy intensity improvements are typically a deci-
sive factor in mitigation scenarios [35]. As final energy
intensity improvements can be the result of technical
energy efficiency improvements, changes in consump-
tion as well as structural effects [36,37], the following
three strategies are identified that can lead to energy
intensity improvements:
 Final energy demand reductions through conven-
tional energy efficiency improvements (e.g. build-
ing insulation);
 Final energy demand reductions through behav-
ioral changes;2
 Direct and indirect electrification – that is, substi-
tution of fossil fuels through low-carbon
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electricity or through renewable energy-based H2
or synthetic fuels/gases.
The emission intensity of energy supply can mainly3
be addressed by the following three separate strategies:
 Increasing the domestic use of zero-carbon
energy sources, either by electricity generation
from domestic renewables or nuclear power or
the use of domestic renewable energy sources in
transport and heating;
 Importing carbon-free (at the point of use) or car-
bon-neutral energy sources/carriers, which can
be net electricity imports, net imports of biomass
or net imports of H2 or synthetic fuels/gases; and
 Using carbon capture and storage (CCS) technol-
ogy to reduce GHG emissions from electricity
generation or from industrial plants.4
Selection and comparison of German
decarbonization scenarios
Selection of scenarios
As mentioned above, there is a long tradition in Ger-
many of scenario development to support energy pol-
icy decisions. Therefore, a large number of energy
scenario studies are available for Germany. For the
meta-analysis in this paper, energy scenarios were
sought that fulfill the following criteria:
 Topicality: The scenarios should be released in
2014 or later;
 Timescale: Scenarios should analyze a time hori-
zon until at least 2050;
 Coverage and level of detail: The scenarios
should cover the entire energy system, including
its end use sectors, in sufficient detail, and should
account for all energy-related CO2 emissions; and
 GHG emission reduction: The scenarios should
explore trajectories that are roughly consistent
with either the lower end (¡ 80%) or the upper
end (¡ 95%) of the German government’s 2050
GHG emissions reduction targets.
Scenarios from the following four studies fulfill all
four established criteria:
 UBA [38]: Germany in 2050 – a greenhouse gas-neu-
tral country, prepared by the Umweltbundesamt,
the German environmental protection agency;
 BMWi [39]: Development of Energy Markets –
Energy Reference Forecast, commissioned by the
German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Energy;
 BMUB [40]: Climate Protection Scenario 2050,
commissioned by the German Federal Ministry
for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Build-
ing and Nuclear Safety; and
 Nitsch [41]: Successful energy transition only with
improved energy efficiency and a climate-
adapted energy market, prepared by Joachim
Nitsch, with previous editions commissioned by
the German Renewable Energy Federation (BEE).
From these four studies, the following five scenarios
will be considered:
 ‘THGND’ from [38]
 ‘Zielszenario’ (abbreviated ZS) from BMWi [39]
 ‘KS 80’ and ‘KS 90’ from BMUB [40]
 ‘KLIMA-17 MEFF’ (abbreviated K17 M) from Nitsch
[41]
The methodology used for developing the scenarios is
relatively similar in all of the four studies. Each of the sce-
narios is developed based on several sector-specific and
technologically detailed bottom-upmodels. Future energy
demand in the various sectors is derived based on a range
of assumptions, including population development, GDP
growth and diffusion of new technologies in the energy
transformation sector and the end-use sectors. The studies
generally apply a simulationmodeling approach, although
the dispatch of non-renewable power plants is modeled
by some of the studies using optimization (cost-minimiza-
tion) models. The modeling framework for all analyzed
studies is therefore generally similar and the differences in
scenario outcomes can be attributed to a great extent on
differences in input assumptions such as technology avail-
ability and diffusion.
Two of the five selected scenarios (ZS, KS 80)
describe reductions of energy-related GHG emissions
of 80 to 85% by 2050 (relative to 1990), and thus relate
to the lower end of the German government’s 2050
emission reduction target. The other three scenarios
(KS 95, K17 M, THGND) describe reductions of 95 to
100% by 2050, thus resembling (or exceeding) the
upper end of the government’s long-term target.
Table 1 provides an overview of the respective devel-
opment of energy-related GHG (or CO2) emissions in
the five scenarios.
In regards to the future population and GDP devel-
opments, the four scenarios that provide data on these
indicators (ZS, KS 80, KS 95 and THGND) make similar
assumptions. Across these scenarios, the population in
Germany is expected to decline from 82.5 million at
the end of 2016 to about 72–74 million in 2050. Simi-
larly, all five scenarios assume roughly similar GDP
growth averaging annually 0.7 to 0.9% (in real terms)
over the period 2010 to 2050.
The THGND scenario is unique among the five ana-
lyzed scenarios in that it only provides one quantitative
description of a possible future energy system for the
year 2050, while the other scenarios also include
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descriptions of how the energy system might develop
over time by providing energy system descriptions
also for the years 2020, 2030 and 2040.
Scenario comparison by key decarbonization
strategies
Final energy demand reductions through
conventional energy efficiency improvements
The potential for conventional energy efficiency
improvements5 can be found in all end-use sectors
and includes building renovation to upgrade energy
performance, improvements in the efficiency of electric
motors in the industry sector and improvements in the
efficiency of fossil-fuel powered vehicles.
Building renovation is a key measure that could con-
siderably reduce energy demand in the building sector.
The average annual rate of renovation to upgrade
energy performance assumed by the scenarios is
shown in Table 2. The comparison indicates that all
scenarios expect this rate to grow in the future, but
that the rate is by far the highest in the KS 95 scenario,
followed by the THGND scenario.6
A comparison between the scenarios of other
underlying assumptions regarding conventional
energy efficiency improvements (beyond the rate of
renovation) is not possible, as the studies do not pro-
vide comparable information in other fields.
Final energy demand reductions through behavioral
changes
Besides efficiency improvements, final energy demand
can also be cut by reducing the demand for energy
services or by shifting demand from highly energy-
intensive to less energy-intensive services. Table 3
provides examples of behavioral (or lifestyle) changes
that can contribute considerably to final energy
demand reductions. The table also shows which
behavioral changes (relative to a respective reference
case) are assumed to be realized in each of the ana-
lyzed mitigation scenarios.7 The table illustrates that
the vast majority of behavioral changes assumed in
the analyzed scenarios focus on reducing energy
demand in the passenger transport sector. Further-
more, the table suggests that with the exception of the
THGND scenario, the more ambitious mitigation sce-
narios (especially the KS 95 scenario) assume more
behavioral changes than the less ambitious ones.
Additional conceivable lifestyle changes, such as reduc-
tions in the floor space per person (which would reverse
the historical trend8) or reductions – compared to a base-
line development – in the number and size of household
appliances (or consumer goods in general) and their use
are not assumed in any of the analyzed scenarios.
Direct and indirect electrification
Direct and indirect electrification refers to the substitu-
tion of fossil fuel energy carriers in end-use sectors
either through electricity (direct electrification) or
through energy carriers derived from electricity (such
as hydrogen or synthetic fuels) [35]. Electrification can
significantly facilitate the decarbonization of end-use
Table 1. Reductions in energy-related GHG emissions in Germany relative to 1990 (%).
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Historical ¡ 16 ¡ 23
¡ 80% to ¡ 85% scenarios ZS ¡ 43 ¡ 56 ¡ 70 ¡ 80
KS 80 ¡ 38 ¡ 55 ¡ 71 ¡ 85
¡ 95% to ¡ 100% scenarios KS 95 ¡ 44 ¡ 67 ¡ 84 ¡ 96
K17 My ¡ 35 ¡ 61 ¡ 82 ¡ 96
THGND n.s. n.s. n.s. ¡ 100
yFor this scenario, instead of energy-related GHG emissions only the sum of energy-related CO2 emissions plus process-related CO2 emissions from the
industrial sector is available. Their development is presented here.
Source: UBA [104] for historical data.
Table 2. Average annual rate of energy-related renovations







KS 80 2010–2050 2.2
KS 95 2010–2050 3.1
K17 M 2020–2050 2.0
THGND 2020–2050 2.7
Sources: IWU and BEI [105] for historical data; [41]; [NITSCH J PERS. COMM].
Table 3. Final energy demand reducing lifestyle changes (rel-
ative to the respective reference case development) assumed
in the scenarios.
ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M THGND
Passenger transport
Shift toward more energy efficient
modes of transportation
(X)y X X
Use of smaller cars X
Introduction of a general speed
limit on motorways
X X




Reduction in room temperatures
in winter
X
Decrease in the per-capita
consumption of meatz
X X X
yOnly a small modal shift is assumed.
zThis lifestyle change’s effects on final energy demand are expected to
be small. The main reason why a reduction in the consumption of
meat is assumed to be realized in some of the scenarios is that it
reduces methane and nitrous oxide emissions in the agricultural
sector.
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sectors in two ways. For one, and as mentioned above,
electrification in some cases allows for the use of more
efficient end-use technologies, enabling final energy
demand to be reduced. All else being equal, the substi-
tution of electric cars for conventional cars, for exam-
ple, leads to final energy demand reductions as electric
engines are more efficient than combustion engines
[42]. Similarly, the substitution of conventional cupola
furnaces by induction melting furnaces can signifi-
cantly increase energy efficiency [43]. Second, electrifi-
cation allows energy carriers (electricity or electricity-
derived fuels or gases) to be used, which in principle
can be made available at very low CO2 emissions and
in large quantities (and at relatively low costs in the
case of electricity) [44–47].
Consequently, direct and indirect electrification are
popular strategies in decarbonization scenarios, as Table 4
illustrates for total final energy demand and Table 5 shows
for each sector. Table 4 highlights that in all analyzed sce-
narios, the historical trend of an increasing share of elec-
tricity in final energy demand is expected not only to
continue, but to significantly accelerate.
However, the extent and structure of electrification
differs considerably between the scenarios: The two
analyzed scenarios achieving emission reductions at the
lower end of the current government target (ZS and KS
80) do not envision that hydrogen and/or synthetic
fuels will play a role by 2050. In contrast, the three most
ambitious scenarios (KS 95, K17 M and especially
THGND) expect these electricity-derived energy carriers
to play a relevant or even dominant role by then. The
combined share of electricity and electricity-derived
energy carriers in total final energy demand in 2050 is
similar in two of the more ambitious scenarios, at 53%
(K17 M) and 54% (KS 95). It amounts to 100% in the
radical THGND scenario, which explicitly aims to
describe a future energy system that is entirely based
on the direct and indirect use of renewable-based elec-
tricity generation. The combined share of electricity and
electricity-derived energy sources is much lower in the
two less ambitious mitigation scenarios.
Looking at the share of electricity and electricity-
derived energy carriers in final energy demand of each
end-use sector (Table 5), it is shown that the electrifica-
tion strategy is applied across the entire economy. All
sectors are expected to be electrified to a greater
extent in the three more ambitious decarbonization
scenarios compared to the other two analyzed scenar-
ios.9 The strongest difference between the scenarios in
terms of electrification can be found in the transport
sector. While the combined share of electricity and
electricity-derived energy carriers grows from a negligi-
ble 2% in 2015 to 13% (ZS) and 25% (KS 80) in the two
less ambitious scenarios, the share increases to 62%
(KS 95), 65% (K17 M) and 100% (THGND), respectively,
in the three scenarios aiming at higher emission reduc-
tions.10 The comparison also shows that there are cur-
rently diverging views among researchers on the likely
or preferable ratio and interdependency of direct and
indirect electrification in the transport sector in a
deeply decarbonized future.
Increasing the use of domestic carbon-free energy
sources
The use of domestic carbon-free energy sources can be
differentiated into the following three types:
 Electricity generation from domestic renewable
energy sources;
 (Non-electricity) use of domestic renewable
energy sources in transport and for heating; and
 Electricity generation from nuclear power.
Table 4. Role of electrification: share of electricity (‘direct’) and hydrogen/synthetic fuels (‘indirect’) in total final energy
demand (%).
1990 2000 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Historical Direct 17 19 20 21
Indirect 0 0 0 0
ZS Direct 22 24 26 29
Indirect 0 0 0 0
KS 80 Direct 23 27 34 41
Indirect 0 0 0 0
KS 95 Direct 23 28 40 50
Indirect 0 0 4 4
K17 M Direct 22 26 31 38
Indirect 0 3 9 15
THGND Direct n.s. n.s. n.s. 35
Indirect 65
Source: AG Energiebilanzen [106] for historical data.
Table 5. Role of electrification: share of electricity (‘direct’)
and hydrogen/synthetic fuels (‘indirect’) in final energy
demand of the end-use sectors (%).
Historical ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M THGND
1990 2015 2050
Industry Direct 25 32 36 37 44 42 47
Indirect 0 0 0 0 0 11 53
Commercial Direct 24 38 51 63 66 65 53
Indirect 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
Residential Direct 18 20 26 36 42 30 70
Indirect 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Transport Direct 2 2 12 25 37 25 15
Indirect 0 0 1 0 25 40 85
Source: AG Energiebilanzen [106] for historical data.
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In the following, the role of these three types of
domestic carbon-free energy sources in the analyzed
scenarios will be discussed separately. The focus will
be on electricity generation from domestic renewable
energy sources, as this is widely expected to become
the most relevant carbon-free energy source in
Germany.
Electricity generation from domestic renewable
energy sources. The further increase of electricity
generation from renewable energy sources and the
associated reduction of fossil fuel-based power genera-
tion is widely regarded as a key strategy for Germany
to reduce its CO2 emissions in the future. Since the
beginning of the last decade, the country has achieved
a considerable increase in electricity generation from
renewable energy sources. This development was sup-
ported by the feed-in-tariffs stipulated in its Renewable
Energy Sources Act, which came into effect in the year
2000. Gross renewable electricity generation in Ger-
many increased from 38 TWh in 2000 to 187 TWh in
2015,11 equivalent to an average annual increase of 10
TWh/a.
As Table 6 shows, all analyzed scenarios foresee fur-
ther increases in electricity generation from renew-
ables, with the increases coming largely from wind
power (both onshore and offshore) and solar photovol-
taics (PV). These renewable energy sources are gener-
ally thought to provide the largest additional technical
and economic potential in the country.12
However, as indicated in Table 6, the extent of the
further deployment of renewable energy technologies
differs considerably between the analyzed scenarios.
By the middle of the century, domestic electricity gen-
eration from renewables reaches 375 TWh/a in the ZS
scenario and 500 TWh/a in the KS 80 scenario, while
much higher values of 734 TWh/a (KS 95) and 864
TWh/a (K17 M) are projected in the two more ambi-
tious scenarios that provide specific data. While these
two scenarios differ in regard to the ratio of onshore
and offshore wind power they envision, they are simi-
lar in the total contribution of wind power by 2050.
Both scenarios suggest that about 560 to 570 TWh/a of
wind power will be required in Germany for deep
decarbonization, which would mean a massive
increase of more than 600% compared to 2015.
Table 7 highlights that in the ZS and KS 80 scenarios
the average annual increase in electricity generation
from renewables does not need to increase relative to
the observed growth between 2000 and 2015. In con-
trast, a considerable further increase (roughly a dou-
bling) will be needed in the future – at least in the
2030 to 2050 period – according to the two scenarios
KS 95 and K17 M, which aim at higher GHG emission
reduction targets.
(Non-electricity) use of domestic renewable energy
sources in transport and for heating. Currently, the
use of renewables in Germany in transport and for
heating is dominated by the use of biomass. Most of
the analyzed scenarios expect only modest increases
in the final energy use of biomass, owing to the limited
availability of sustainable biomass in Germany. The use
of environmental heat and solar thermal energy,
mainly for the purpose of heating in buildings, on the
other hand, is expected to increase considerably in all
scenarios compared to today’s use, with the exception
of the THGND scenario (see the note to Table 8). How-
ever, unlike in the case of electricity generation, no
clear link between the extent of the use of renewables
for transport and heating and the level of ambition of
the scenarios can be discerned. In the case of domestic
biomass, its role in meeting final energy demand
depends on different assumptions in the respective
Table 6. Domestic electricity generation from renewable energy sources in Germany (in TWh/a).y
Historical ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M
1990 2015 2030 2050
Wind onshore 0 71 111 140 154 182 150 221 390 284
Wind offshore 0 8 44 59 51 94 64 122 180 274
Hydro 20 19 19 23 23 23 19 25 25 24
Biomass 2 50 63 21 24 66 60 5 4 73
Solar photovoltaics 0 39 70 65 66 113 75 115 123 192
Other renewables 0 0 7 4 4 4 7 12 12 17
TOTAL 21 187 314 312 323 482 375 500 734 864
yNo detailed electricity generation data is available for the THGND scenario, but it is roughly assumed that the foreseen (direct) demand for electricity in
the end-use sectors can be met by domestic renewable electricity generation, which would require an electricity generation of about 600 TWh/a. For
comparison: German gross electricity generation in 2015 amounted to 647 TWh, with 52 TWh of net exports [106].
Source: AG Energiebilanzen [106] for historical data.
Table 7. Average annual increase in electricity generation from renewable energy sources in Germany (in TWh/a).y
Historical ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M
2000–2015 Base year to 2030 2030–2050
All renewables 10.0 10.0 9.5 10.1 21.0 3.1 9.4 20.6 19.1
yNo detailed electricity generation data is available for the THGND scenario.
Source: AG Energiebilanzen [106] for historical data.
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scenarios. These assumptions concern the availability
of sustainably sourced domestic biomass and the share
of it used for non-end use purposes, such as electricity
generation and central heating.
Electricity generation from nuclear power. In accor-
dance with the decision of the German government to
phase out nuclear power by the end of 2022, the
decarbonization strategy of increased electricity gener-
ation from nuclear power is not pursued in any of the
analyzed German decarbonization scenarios.
Importing low-carbon or carbon-free energy sources
Importing low-carbon or carbon-free energy sources is
another option to reduce the consumption of fossil
fuel energy sources. Currently, Germany is a net
exporter of biomass and especially of electricity (see
Table 9). The sizeable current net electricity exports are
a consequence of power plant overcapacities in Ger-
many, combined with the fact that a large amount of
those capacities exhibit lower variable generation costs
than most power plants in neighboring European
countries [48–50]. However, decarbonization scenarios
expect Germany to become a net importer of low- or
zero-carbon energy sources in the future. This is
because Europe’s coasts (onshore and offshore wind)
[51] and its south (solar PV and concentrating solar
power) [52] exhibit considerable renewable energy
potentials that are expected to be relatively inexpen-
sive to tap [53,54]. Consequently, it is expected to be
cheaper for Germany to cover part of its future energy
demand through renewables-based electricity
generation (and, in some scenarios, electricity-derived
energy carriers) from abroad.
While only one of the analyzed scenarios (ZS)
describes sizeable net biomass imports in the year
2050, all five scenarios expect Germany to become a
net importer of electricity by then (see Table 9). How-
ever, the extent of imported electricity varies consider-
ably, ranging from a modest 29 PJ/a in the KS 95
scenario to a massive 583 PJ/a in the K17 M scenario
and possibly even more in the THGND scenario. The KS
95 scenario further assumes that by the middle of the
century, electricity-derived synthetic fuels for the trans-
port sector are imported from abroad.13 The THGND
scenario does not provide a specific estimate of the
shares between electricity and electricity-derived
energy carriers in imports (see note to Table 9), but
expects that between about 4000 and 8200 PJ of
energy will need to be imported by 2050. Energy
imports in this scenario are much higher than in the
others as it is assumed that end-use sectors heavily
rely on synthetic fuels (with considerable associated
energy transformation losses), that the realizable
potential for domestic renewable electricity generation
is limited compared to assumptions in other scenarios
and that synthetic fuels (about 1000 PJ per year) will
be needed for material use in the chemical industry.
Using CCS technology
It is generally assumed that for economic reasons as
well as for a lack of public acceptance [55], coal or nat-
ural gas power plants using CCS will not play a signifi-
cant role in Germany in the future [56]. Indeed, none of
the analyzed scenarios relies on CCS technology to
Table 8. Use of domestic renewable energy sources in Germany for transport and heating in the end-use sectors (in PJ/a).y
Historical ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M
2015 2030 2050
Biomass (heating) 503 593 502 633 578 605 706 691 583
Biofuels 108 373 107 90 200 442z 116 109 260
Environmental heat 41 164 104 142 180 240 221 254 445
Solar thermal 28 162 136 134 124 246 149 131 351
TOTAL 680 1292 849 999 1082 1533 1192 1185 1639
yThe sustainable and economic potential of the direct use of renewables in the end-use sectors is considered to be very small by the authors of the
THGND scenario and they therefore do not consider these energy sources in their quantitative modelling.
zAn additional 215 PJ of biofuels are used in the ZS scenario in 2050 (for a total of 657 PJ). However, in the ZS scenario, 215 PJ of net biomass imports are
realized in 2050 (see Table 9 below) and it is assumed here that this biomass is imported in the form of biofuels.
Source: AG Energiebilanzen [106] for historical data.
Table 9. Net primary energy imports of low-/zero-carbon energy sources (in PJ/a).
Historical ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M THGND
2015 2030 2050
Biomass ¡ 22 0 261 252 0 215 14 0 0 0
Electricity ¡ 186 ¡ 25 0 77 61 57 238 29 583 » 4000 to 8200y
Hydrogen, synthetic fuels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143 0
TOTAL ¡ 208 ¡ 25 0 77 61 272 238 172 583 » 4000 to 8200
yThe THGND scenario does not specify exactly how much of the synthetic fuel for which domestic renewable energy potential is assumed to be insuffi-
cient will be imported from abroad and how much will be produced domestically using imported electricity. The low-end figure in this table assumes
that only synthetic fuels will be imported (and conversion losses would occur outside of Germany), while the high-end figure assumes that only elec-
tricity will be imported and transformed into synthetic fuels in Germany.
Source: AG Energiebilanzen [106] for historical data.
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decarbonize electricity supply. However, one of the
two ambitious scenarios (KS 95) assumes that from
2030 on CCS technology will be used to reduce CO2
emissions from the industrial sector. Specifically, CCS in
this scenario is assumed to be used to capture and
sequester both process and energy-related CO2 emis-
sions from several industries such as cement produc-
tion, crude steel production and the production of
certain chemicals. The annual amount of sequestered
CO2 is assumed to increase from 12 Mt in 2030 to 29
Mt in 2040 and 41 Mt in 2050. According to the authors
of the KS 95 scenario, domestic storage capacities
would allow for a long-term use of the technology
even if the most conservative estimates for the CO2
storage potential in Germany were accurate.
Discussion: what can be learned from the
differences between 80% and 95% GHG
reduction scenarios?
Based on the scenario meta-analysis performed in the
above section on "Scenario comparison by key decar-
bonization strategies", Table 10 provides a comparative
overview of whether and to what extent the six energy
system mitigation strategies (or their respective sub-
strategies) differentiated in this article are pursued in
each of the five analyzed scenarios.
The summary of the results from the meta-analysis
of German mitigation scenarios allows the following
four key insights to be derived:
 The pace of historical changes observed in Ger-
many between 2000 and 2015 is insufficient to
adequately contribute to not only the 1.5 C tar-
get, but also the 2 C long-term global target;
 The type of mitigation strategies applied can vary
strongly from one scenario to another, even for sce-
narios with similar 2050 emission reduction targets;
 Energy scenarios for Germany more in line with
the Paris Agreement’s ‘well below 2 C’ target
tend to use more strategies and to use certain
strategies to a greater extent; and
 Following the pathway of an 80% GHG emission
reduction by the middle of the century may make
it increasingly difficult to achieve timely further
reductions after 2050.
In regard to the first point it can be shown that in
almost all of the differentiated mitigation strategies,
the pace of historical changes observed in Germany
between 2000 and 2015 is clearly insufficient to reach
an 80% GHG emission reduction by 2050 (relative to
1990).14 The only exception is the pace of past
increases of electricity generation from domestic
renewable energy sources. If, however, a 95% GHG
emission reduction is aimed for, the implementation of
even this strategy will need to be strengthened, the
scenarios suggest.
Focusing on the type of mitigation strategies, it can
be observed that even for similar 2050 emission reduc-
tion targets there are varying views among researchers
on whether and how much to rely on individual strate-
gies. Researchers apparently associate different levels
of risks and uncertainties with the realization of certain
strategies. On the demand side, for example, views dif-
fer on whether widespread behavioral changes toward
less energy-intensive lifestyles should be pursued or
can potentially be successful. On the supply side,
assessments differ, for example, in regard to the ques-
tion of whether CCS use in industry will be socially
acceptable and whether economic conditions will ever
allow for a widespread implementation of this technol-
ogy. Similarly, some authors argue the expected costs
of indirect electrification are too high for this strategy
to be pursued substantially [39]. Undoubtedly, risks
and uncertainties exist for each of the differentiated
strategies, suggesting that from today’s perspective it
is sensible to pursue as many (sustainable) strategies
as possible, if achieving long-term climate targets are
indeed a priority for policymakers and society. After all,
it is likely that some will fail or underachieve [28,57,58].
Table 10. Comparative overview of reliance on individual mitigation strategies in each of the analyzed scenarios.
ZS KS 80 KS 95 K17 M THGND
Final energy demand reductions through conventional energy efficiency improvements ++ ++ +++ ++ +++
Final energy demand reductions through behavioral changes o + +++ ++ +
Direct and indirect electrification
Direct electrification + ++ +++ ++ ++
Indirect electrification o o + ++ +++
Increasing the use of domestic carbon-free energy sources
Use of domestic renewables for electricity generation + ++ +++ +++ ++
Use of domestic renewables for transport and heating +++ ++ ++ +++ o
Use of nuclear power o o o o o
Importing low-carbon or carbon-free energy sources/carriers
Biomass ++ o o o o
Electricity + ++ + +++ +++
Hydrogen and synthetic fuels o o ++ o
Using carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) for emissions from power plants o o o o o
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) for emissions from industry o o ++ o o
A circle indicates that a strategy is not relied upon, while a ‘+’ indicates that a certain strategy is used to a limited extent, ‘++’ indicates that it is used to
an intermediate extent and ‘+++’ indicates that the strategy is relied upon strongly.
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Concerning the number of strategies it is not a sur-
prise that more ambitious energy scenarios for Ger-
many, and those that are more in line with the Paris
Agreement’s ‘well below 2 C’ target, tend to use more
strategies and tend to use certain strategies, which are
listed below, to a greater extent.
 Behavioral changes toward less energy-intensive
lifestyles are not assumed to occur in all scenarios
and are much more likely to be assumed (and to
be assumed to a stronger extent) in the more
ambitious mitigation scenarios;
 Electrification, both direct and, especially, indirect
in the form of the use of electricity-based syn-
thetic fuels, is clearly used to a greater extent in
more ambitious mitigation scenarios;
 Electricity generation from domestic renewables
tends to be exploited to a greater extent;
 Imports of electricity and/or hydrogen and syn-
thetic fuels are also assumed to a much greater
extent in the highly ambitious scenarios; and
 While the use of CCS for industry is assumed in
only one of the analyzed scenarios, this scenario
is one of the more ambitious ones, suggesting
that the use of this technology might be needed
in the future, if other strategies (such as importing
low-carbon or carbon-free energy sources/car-
riers) are not to be pursued to a very significant
extent.
The above analysis suggests that aiming initially for
an 80% GHG emission reduction by the middle of the
century will sooner or later make it increasingly difficult
to achieve a more ambitious reduction after 2050, or to
achieve a more ambitious reduction target for 2050, in
case it is decided to aim at higher reductions at a later
point in time. While a more in-depth analysis of
branching points between the more ambitious and
less ambitious scenarios would be needed to derive a
comprehensive and temporally detailed assessment of
lock-in risks, there are indications that focusing on
moderate emission reduction targets today can lead to
significant barriers for achieving higher emission
reduction targets in the future. The following strategies
provide examples for this hypothesis:
 Strong efficiency improvements in the building
sector require early action, as it will require time
to renovate all or even most of today’s building
stock by 2050 [57,59];
 More research is needed on whether and how
behavioral change can be initiated or supported
[60], especially as these aspects often play no, or
only a secondary, role in scenario development
[28]. Yet, finding consensus on changes in societal
norms will likely require significant amounts of
time given that such changes will be
controversial as they are potentially not in line
with the objectives of influential interest groups.
Therefore, society should discuss early on
whether and to what extent behavioral changes
will be pursued for the sake of reducing GHG
emissions – or perhaps for other reasons as well;
 A considerable increase in the use of domestic
renewable energy sources for electricity genera-
tion will require significant modifications and
expansions of the transmission and distribution
grids, which typically take many years to be
planned, agreed upon and implemented [61,62];
 Before indirect electrification can contribute to
energy-system CO2 reductions, individual tech-
nologies need to be further developed, system
knowledge needs to be accumulated and new
infrastructure needs to be built to considerable
dimensions [63–65]. And, prior to that, decisions
on the desired system structure need to be
made, for example in regard to the questions of
whether (mainly) H2 will be used in end-use sec-
tors or whether (mainly) synthetic fuels will be
used; whether fuel production should be central-
ized or rather decentralized; and whether fuels
will be imported or (mainly) produced domesti-
cally. These decisions are substantial as from
today’s perspective, net-neutral emissions in the
German energy system are very difficult to imag-
ine without a strong use of H2 and/or synthetic
fuels. Consequently, relying on this strategy is
likely to be required in the future, at least in the
second half of the century. Therefore, it appears
to be sensible to set course in this direction early
on, instead of going to extremes to be able to
avoid these developments in the coming
decades.
 In regard to CCS in industry, early investments
would be required for industrial plants as well as
in transport and storage infrastructure. This
implies that there will likely be at least a decade
or two between planning and implementing this
strategy and actually realizing the expected levels
of emission reductions [28].
Conclusion
This article seeks to improve our understanding of the
nature of the energy system transformation that would
be needed in the coming decades in Germany and
other countries with similar energy systems to ade-
quately contribute to the 1.5 C or the ‘well below 2 C’
targets of the Paris Agreement. To this end, five
recently published, technologically detailed energy-
system scenarios for Germany, with different levels of
mid-century emission reductions, have been analyzed
and compared. A differentiation of six key energy-sys-
tem decarbonization strategies – three targeting the
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demand side and three targeting the supply side – has
been proposed for the analysis. Differentiating among
these strategies, and several additional sub-strategies,
appears to be suitable to compare energy-system
transformation visions of different scenarios and –
more generally – to enable a nuanced analysis and dis-
cussion of the available options to considerably reduce
energy-related GHG emissions in the future.
Our meta-analysis highlights that the more ambi-
tious energy scenarios for Germany, and those that are
more in line with the Paris Agreement’s ‘well below 2
C’ target, tend to use more decarbonization strategies
and use certain strategies, such as the extent of
demand-side energy efficiency, lifestyle changes and
indirect electrification via (domestically produced and/
or imported) synthetic energy carriers to a greater
extent.15 Furthermore, a comparison with past energy-
system changes in Germany underscores the fact that
the pace of historical changes observed in Germany
between 2000 and 2015 is clearly insufficient to
achieve an 80% reduction in GHG emission by 2050
(relative to 1990).
The discussion of the differences in several key
decarbonization strategies between scenarios that
might be compatible with 2 C warming and those
that might be compatible with a warming ‘well below
2 C’ suggests that the ‘lock-in’ phenomenon needs to
be taken into account in any present-day decarboniza-
tion strategy and policy. The time period in which
countries can remain uncommitted regarding their
level of ambition in terms of mid-century emission
reductions appears to be coming to an end, as certain
decarbonization strategies (such as widespread and
deep renovation of buildings, considerable further
expansion of renewable electricity generation and pro-
duction of synthetic fuels and the introduction of CCS)
which are most likely needed to achieve deep emission
reductions will require several decades to be success-
fully implemented. This is the case because of the high
number of political and economic actors involved, the
infrastructural expansions required and/or the techno-
logical advances needed.
While the present study provides important insights,
the chosen approach also entails some limitations. One
of the key limitations of this study is the low number of
scenarios that could be included in the meta-analysis.
The implications drawn from this analysis are therefore
currently only transferable to a limited extent. This limi-
tation could be overcome by future studies performing
similar analyses with bottom-up energy scenarios avail-
able for other countries.
It should also be noted that while scenarios are
helpful tools to show the potential differences in miti-
gation pathways consistent with 2 or 1.5 C, in order to
achieve deep decarbonization in practice far more
detailed information would be required for the policy-
making process. Therefore, further research, for
example in regards to the feasibility of mitigation strat-
egies, their respective barriers and risks, and their
respective macroeconomic implications, should be
conducted on global, regional and country-specific
scales. Such analyses should also attempt to consider
the particularities of individual sectors such as industry
and transport. Additional research is especially impor-
tant and urgent in regard to the 1.5 C target, as only
very limited research in line with this target is available
and as far-reaching policy decisions and actions need
to be taken very soon to keep this target within reach.
Notes
1. However, it is discussed whether reduced growth or ‘de-
growth’ should be pursued (among other things) to
reduce GHG emissions [66]. It should further be noted
that a certain impact on GDP is possible if the second
mitigation strategy (behavioral changes) is pursued
strongly.
2. Behavioral changes are defined as any changes in con-
sumption patterns leading to lower final energy
demand. Such changes can take the form of lower
demand for certain products (e.g. cars) and energy serv-
ices (e.g. distance travelled by car) or a shift from one
product or type of energy service to another one with
lower energy intensity (e.g. switching from car use to
public transportation use). Behavioral changes can either
reduce final energy demand directly in the household or
passenger transport sectors or it can do so indirectly in
the commercial, industry and freight transport sectors as
a consequence of lower demand for certain products
and energy services.
3. In deep decarbonization scenarios, the fuel switch from
high-carbon to lower carbon fossil fuel sources (e.g.
from coal to natural gas) is typically of only minor impor-
tance, especially in the longer term. This mitigation strat-
egy is therefore not included within the key strategies
discussed here.
4. This strategy includes the use of biomass with carbon
capture and storage (BECCS), but does not include any
other so-called negative emissions technologies (NETs)
such as direct air capture, as these are not related
directly to the energy system. In German decarboniza-
tion scenarios, typically no utilization of these technolo-
gies (either BECCS or other NETs) is foreseen. Germany
neither has very large biomass resources, nor are signifi-
cant CO2 storage potentials available. Furthermore, the
implementation of BECCS as well as of other NETs is
associated with various social, economic and biophysical
challenges, which are anticipated to considerably con-
strain their widespread application [11].
5. The term ‘conventional’ is chosen to point out that this
strategy only refers to efficiency improvements that are
not related to electrification measures.
6. The authors of the KS 95 scenario mention that further
studies are required to investigate whether the high rate
of renovation they assume can indeed be realized by
craftsmanship and industry.
7. The behavioral and lifestyle changes listed in the table
are either explicitly assumed by the scenario developers
and taken into account in their quantitative modeling,
or they are mentioned as one way (alongside efficiency
improvements through technological change) to
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achieve the energy demand reductions assumed by the
respective scenarios.
8. Floor space per person in Germany grew by about 1% annu-
ally on average between 2000 and 2015 [67]. All of the sce-
narios analyzed in this article assume that floor space per
person will continue to grow until 2050, although future
growth rates are expected to become smaller.
9. The only exception is the residential sector, in which
electrification in the K17 M scenario is less pronounced
than in the KS 80 scenario.
10. The strict emission limits in the highly ambitious scenar-
ios do not allow for significant fossil fuel-related emis-
sions in the transport sector by the middle of the
century. Other decarbonization strategies are either not
available in the transport sector (such as the use of solar
or geothermal heat or the use of CCS) or severely
restricted due to limited potential (such as the use of
sustainably sourced biofuels).
11. These 187 TWh were equivalent to a 29% share of renew-
ables in Germany’s gross electricity generation [106].
12. Based on several available potential studies, the German
Environment Agency [38] derived estimates for the tech-
nical-ecological potential of renewable energy sources
for electricity generation in Germany and concluded
that up to about 1500 TWh of electricity from renewable
energy sources could be generated by 2050, with up to
1000 TWh coming from onshore wind power and up to
about 250 TWh coming from solar PV plants installed on
available structures.
13. These imports of synthetic fuels partly substitute for the
lower net electricity imports compared to the same
study’s KS 80 scenario.
14. Similar findings of insufficient progress in various areas
of the energy transition were recently derived for Europe
as a whole [18].
15. It should be noted that due to the current legal framework
and especially a lack of public acceptance in Germany, the
strategies of expanding the use of nuclear power and
using CCS technology for power plants are typically not
pursued in decarbonization scenarios for Germany. This is
also true for the five scenarios analyzed in this article.
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